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LAND TITLING: A MODE OF PRIVATIZATION WITH THE 
POTENTIAL TO DEEPEN DEMOCRACY 
BERNADETTE ATUAHENE* 
Thousands of people in the developing world are in constant danger of 
eviction.  These are poor individuals and families, who live illicitly on state-
owned land because they have few—if any—housing options.  In response to 
this crisis, several governments, including Thailand, Peru, South Africa, 
Ghana, and Brazil, have given individuals ownership to the land they occupy—
a phenomenon commonly known as land titling.1  I argue that when property is 
transferred to poor people through land titling measures, democracy is 
strengthened. 
Insofar as the property transferred is state owned, this is, indeed, a form of 
privatization.  What distinguishes this mode of privatization from how we 
typically understand it is that the decision-making function is assigned to poor 
people rather than the local elite or multinationals.2  This is why privatization 
via land titling has the potential to deepen and strengthen nascent 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  J.D. 2002, Yale Law School; 
M.P.A. 2002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government; B.A. 1997, 
University of California, Los Angeles.  I would like to thank Carol Rose and the other 
participants of the Saint Louis University School of Law Childress Lecture, Chicago-Kent faculty 
workshop participants, and the participants of the Property, Citizenship and Social 
Entrepreneurism (PCSE) annual meeting.  A special thanks to Marty Malin and Graeme 
Dinwoodie for their extensive written comments on this paper.  Exceptional research assistance 
was provided by Michael Huston, Emily Grande, and Stephanie Crawford. 
 1. Property is often conceptualized as a bundle of sticks.  This bundle includes, inter alia, 
sticks such as the right to occupy/use, exclude, transfer and mortgage.  Under land titling 
programs, members of informal communities transition from having one stick in the bundle 
(possession) to all of the sticks (ownership in fee simple).  Others have defined land titling as “a 
policy intervention to introduce systems to formally recognize rights in land and enable the state 
and individuals to trade in these rights.”  Id. (quoting TONY BURNS ET AL., LAND TITLING 
EXPERIENCE IN ASIA 1.3 (1998), http://www.surv.ufl.edu/publications/land_conf96/BURNS.pdf). 
 2. Privatization is “the delegation of the decision-making function historically assigned to a 
governmental entity to a non-governmental entity.”  Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 395 (2003).  See generally Amy Chua, The Privatization-
Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995). 
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democracies.3  The challenge is ensuring that various forms of corruption do 
not prevent land titles from reaching the poor.  This can be difficult because in 
weak democracies, officials have latitude to privatize land in a corrupt, self-
serving fashion.  When privatization of land does not benefit the poor, it does 
not bolster democracy. 
First, using Peru as an example,4 I will explain the process by which poor 
individuals and families receive title to the land they occupy.  Second, I will 
argue that there are four primary ways that land titling strengthens democracy. 
By creating a property-owning society, land titling: 
1. Gives indigent populations a buffer between themselves and the state, 
which allows them to make the independent electoral decisions vital to 
a functioning democracy; 
2. Makes poor people stakeholders in democratic institutions; 
3. Gives people an incentive to secure greater liberties; and 
4. Provides a space where individual autonomy is respected and minority 
viewpoints, critical to a healthy democracy, can thrive. 
I.  THE JOURNEY TOWARD LEGAL RECOGNITION OF INFORMAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
The formal recognition of informal land holdings is not the beginning, but 
rather the culmination of a long, arduous journey for many poor individuals 
and families.  In urban areas, informal communities (e.g., squatter settlements) 
are commonly a result of a substantial migration of poor rural populations to 
urban centers in search of expanded employment and educational 
opportunities.5  A constant flow of rural migrants can rapidly exhaust state 
 
 3. Census data consistently show that, controlling for other factors, property owners are 
more apt to participate in the democratic process through voting.  See JENNIFER CHEESEMAN 
DAY & KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION 
OF NOVEMBER 2002: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 8 (2004); AMIE JAMIESON, HYON B. SHIN 
& JENNIFER DAY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF 
NOVEMBER 2000: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 5–8 (2002); JENNIFER C. DAY & AVALAURA 
L. GAITHER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF 
NOVEMBER 1998: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 8 (2000). 
 4. I will use Peru as a case study because it is one of the most extensive and well-
documented instances of land titling. 
 5. Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Poverty in 
Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2004).  In this Article, I will 
focus on urban titling, although titling occurs both in rural and urban areas.  The main difference 
between the two is that access to quality land in rural areas means access to fertile land, which 
gives one the ability to farm and provide for the needs of her family.  Id.  “In contrast, access to 
quality land in urban areas places the poor closer to employment opportunities and within 
neighborhoods with basic infrastructure and services.”  Id.  “Whereas rural titling involves 
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resources and the low-end housing market’s ability to absorb newcomers.  This 
overflow population is then faced with three choices: move back to the 
opportunity-deprived rural communities that they sought to escape, remain in 
the city without shelter, or invade a vacant or underutilized parcel of land.  In 
Peru and several other countries, many chose to invade public lands. 
In general, private lands are invaded less often than public lands for two 
reasons.  First, private owners are usually more vigilant and will move to evict 
the invaders before they acquire informal rights.  Second, various governments 
have taken an ambivalent approach to land invasions, which increases 
incentives to invade public land.  At worst, in Peru, politicians actually were 
complicit in land invasions in an attempt to garner political support.  At best, if 
the invasion is sizable, it can be political suicide for politicians to evict 
vulnerable families without making alternative housing arrangements.  In the 
cases where squatters invaded private lands at the urban fringe of Lima, the 
government relocated them to public lands or purchased the land for them.6 
In Peru, invasions were orchestrated events that principally took place 
from the 1960s through the 1980s.  A deluge of rural inhabitants moved to 
urban areas in the 1960s as a result of rapid job growth in the cities and 
through the 1980s as a consequence of the instability created in rural areas by 
the guerilla war begun by the Shining Path.7  Upon arrival, these migrants 
 
increasing the productivity of land, urban titling involves providing opportunities to earn physical 
capital and develop human capital.”  Id. 
 6. See Carol Graham, The APRA Government and the Urban Poor: The PAIT Programme 
in Lima’s Pueblos Jóvenes, 23 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 91 (1991).  In a town called Pampa de Arena, 
500 families invaded, while in Huascar 35,000 families were involved.  Id. at 107.  The media 
coverage surrounding the Huascar invasion drew attention to the underlying problem, which was 
the shortage of low-income housing.  Id.  Those who participated in the invasions captured the 
public’s sympathy and thus although the invaders were evicted, politicians had to provide 
alternate housing arrangements.  Id.  The state relocated the families to a plot of public land on 
the urban fringes.  Id. 
  The government helped squatters buy the private lands they had invaded in the 
Philippines.  See Atuahene, supra note 5, nn.44, 129, 131 (citing Michael Lee, The Community 
Mortgage Program: An Almost-Successful Alternative for Some Urban Poor, 19 HABITAT INT’L 
529, 529 (1995)); Gilberto M. Llanto et al., A Study of Housing Subsidies in the Philippines 1 
(Phil. Inst. for Dev. Studies, Discussion Paper Series No. 98-42, 1998) http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ 
ris/dps/pidsdps9842.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2006); Faith Chistian Q. Cacnio, Microfinance 
Approach to Housing: The Community Mortage Program (Phil. Inst. for Dev. Studies, Discussion 
Paper Series No. 2001-28, 2001), http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/pdf/pidsdps0128.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2006). 
 7. See Center for Defense Information, Terrorism Project: In the Spotlight: Sendero 
Luminoso, July 1, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sendero.cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) 
(summarizing the “Shining Path” movement).  See generally GUNNAR MALMBERG, 
GEOGRAPHICAL REPORTS NO. 9: METROPOLITAN GROWTH AND MIGRATION IN PERU (1988). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
764 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:761 
found that there was a shortage of dwellings.8  Consequently, a small group of 
people often identified public land that, in their estimation, the state would be 
unlikely to defend.  This land was usually of low value, far from employment 
opportunities, and located in environmentally unsound locations such as on 
river banks, hillsides, and flood-prone areas.9  This small group then usually 
recruited others, occupied the land under the cover of nightfall, constructed 
temporary shelters of bamboo and straw, and hoped that police would not force 
them to leave in the morning.  The larger the invasion, the less likely it was for 
politicians to instruct police to evict the families, due to the ensuing bad 
publicity.10 
 
 8. Lima’s deficit in homes was 1.5 million in 2000.  Catherine Elton, Peruvian Squatters 
Get Attention at Election Time, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2000, at 7. 
 9. In many countries besides Peru, poor people occupy the worst land.  See Alan Gilbert & 
Peter M. Ward, Land for the Rich, Land for the Poor, in THE URBANIZATION OF THE THIRD 
WORLD 129, 134 (Josef Gugler ed., 1988). 
In general, invasions have occupied only those areas of public land that would fetch low 
prices on the market.  For example, most land invasions in Lima have occurred on desert 
lands distant from the city centre, the invasions of Guayaquil have occupied swampland, 
those of Caracas the unstable hillsides, and those of Barranquilla the land close to the 
river estuary.  A few exceptions, such as the favelas in Copacabana or the Policarpa 
Salvarrieta invasion in Bogotá, have occupied central land and have been vigorously 
opposed and sometimes eradicated . . . Generally, valuable public land has not been 
invaded. 
Id. (citations omitted); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 
179, 183–228 (1995) (documenting the condition of colonias, which are poor, Latino 
neighborhoods in Texas near the Mexican border that often lack clean running water, sanitary 
sewers for disposal of human waste, paved roads, storm drains, electricity, trash collection, 
streetlights or street addresses); see also Lee, supra note 6, at 538 (stating that poor people in the 
Philippines build squatter communities in environmentally unsound locations).  Also, the 
literature on environmental justice documents the fact that poor people occupy the worst land.  
See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1993) (claiming that 
lawmakers choose to place environmentally hazardous facilities in poor and minority areas 
because this is the least politically damaging course of action due to the fact that the poor and 
minorities are the least likely to participate in politics); Kent E. Portney, Environmental Justice 
and Sustainability: Is There a Critical Nexus in the Case of Waste Disposal or Treatment Facility 
Siting?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 827 (1994) (documenting how minority and poor populations 
bear the risk of environmentally impacting events). 
 10. In a town called Pampa de Arena, 500 families invaded, while in Huascar 35,000 
families were involved.  See Graham, supra note 6, at 107 (detailing the Huascar invasion); 
Henry Dietz, Urban Squatter Settlements in Peru: A Case History and Analysis, 11 J. INTER-AM. 
STUD. 353, 356–59 (1969) (case study concerning the Pampa de Arena invasion).  The media 
coverage surrounding the Huascar invasion drew attention to the underlying problem, which was 
the shortage of low-income housing.  Graham, supra note 6, at 107.  Those who participated in 
the invasions captured the public’s sympathy and thus although the invaders were evicted, 
politicians had to provide alternate housing arrangements.  Id. 
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Despite less than auspicious beginnings, over the years informal 
settlements have grown into established communities where properties are 
commonly bought and sold on the informal market.11  The longer a community 
has been in existence, the more secure its informal rights;12 thus, in long-
standing communities, investments such as paved roads and other forms of 
capital-intensive infrastructure are common even in the absence of land titling.  
In newer communities land titling gives people the security they need to invest 
and as a result, where the original straw shacks once stood, dwellings of brick 
and mortar are erected and a town with basic functions emerges. 
In the 1990s, the movement to legally recognize informal settlements 
began in earnest.  Hernando de Soto wrote two influential books that drew 
international attention to the importance of land titling—The Other Path and 
Mystery of Capital.13  De Soto argues that the reason capitalism flourishes in 
the West and fails elsewhere is due to disparate access to capital.14  Although 
poor people in the developing world have assets, these assets cannot be 
transformed into capital because they are locked in the informal economy, 
where they cannot be used as collateral for loans.15  This dead or illiquid 
capital is caused by the inordinate amount of bureaucratic red tape necessary to 
gain legal title to land.  For instance, in Peru it takes six years, eleven months, 
and 207 administrative steps through 52 government offices to obtain 
 
 11. In another article, I argue that the titling process pursued by Peru missed an opportunity 
to dismantle expansive ghettos, which in Peru are called pueblos jovenes.  The pueblos jovenes 
were created by invasions and formalized through titling procedures.  See Atuahene, supra note 5, 
at 1138–43.  Pueblos jovenes are located at the urban fringes of Lima far from employment 
opportunities, quality schools, and basic infrastructure and services.  Id. at 1143–44.  The location 
of the titled land has various costs that will be borne by all residents who occupy the plot of land 
for generations to come so long as nothing significant changes.  Id.  I propose a method of land 
titling called “titling mobility” that does not create or ossify areas of concentrated poverty and 
focuses on breaking cycles of poverty.  See id. 1116–37. 
 12. Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property 
Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 988–89 (2002) (In urban Ecuador, property values 
increased by 23.5% on average for newer communities, and 51.6% for communities in existence 
for one year). 
 13. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD (1989) [hereinafter THE OTHER PATH]; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF 
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) 
[hereinafter THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL]; see also Ray Bromley, A New Path to Development? 
The Significance and Impact of Hernando de Soto’s Ideas on Underdevelopment, Production and 
Reproduction, 66 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 328 (1990). 
 14. THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 13, at 5. 
 15. De Soto and his organization, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), argue that 
informal real estate holdings are worth $74 billion in Peru (eleven times more than Peru’s 
potentially privatizable government assets); $133 billion in the Philippines (seven times greater 
than all commercial banks’ total deposits in that country); and $240 billion in Egypt (fifty-five 
times the value of all foreign investment in that country).  Id. at 33–34. 
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permission to build a house on state-owned land, and it takes 728 steps to 
obtain legal title to the house.16  The Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD) 
has documented similarly cumbersome processes in other countries as well.17  
De Soto’s proposed solution is to streamline the land titling process and make 
it easy for people to have their informal assets legally recognized and thus 
brought into the formal economy.18 
The ILD found that legal recognition of assets via land titling increased the 
value of land in Peru by 900%,19 and other researchers have found that it 
increased property values by 23.5% in urban Ecuador;20 58% in Davao, 
Philippines;21 23% in Manila;22 and 45% in Jakarta.23  Land titling is also 
correlated to increased investment in property and access to credit.24  While 
there have been studies that question the economic benefits of titling,25 the 
majority of the evidence suggests that there are significant economic benefits. 
 
 16. Id. at 20. 
 17. In the Philippines it takes 168 steps, through fifty-three public and private agencies, 
during thirteen to twenty-five years.  Id.  In Egypt it takes seventy-seven steps, through thirty-one 
public and private agencies, during five to fourteen years.  Id. 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. See generally id. 
 20. Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 12, at 988. 
 21. Emmanuel Jimenez, Tenure Security and Urban Squatting, 66 REV. ECON. & STAT. 556, 
565–66 (1984). 
 22. Joseph Friedman et al., The Demand for Tenure Security in Developing Countries, 29 J. 
DEV. ECON. 185, 197–98 (1988) (“On average dwelling units in the squatter sector of Manila 
would rent for 11 percent more or sell for 23 percent more had they been in the formal sector.”). 
 23. David E. Dowall & Michael Leaf, The Price of Land for Housing in Jakarta, 28 URB. 
STUD. 707, 718 (1991); see also Gershon Feder & Akihiko Nishio, The Benefits of Land 
Registration and Titling: Economic and Social Perspectives, 15 LAND USE POL’Y 25, 36 (1998) 
(“[Based on] empirical evidence from Asia, Latin America, and Africa[,] [t]he net economic 
benefits of land registration can be substantial.”). 
 24. See Feder & Nishio, supra note 23, at 26–29; Yongyuth Chalamwong & Gershon Feder, 
Land Ownership Security and Land Values in Rural Thailand 13–23 (World Bank Staff Working 
Papers, No. 790, 1986); GERSHON FEDER ET AL., LAND POLICIES AND FARM PRODUCTIVITY IN 
THAILAND 44–69 (1988).  See generally LEE ALSTON ET AL., TITLES, CONFLICT AND LAND USE 
(1999); Gershon Feder & David Feeny, Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and 
Implications for Development Policy, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 135 (1991); Janelle Larson et 
al., An Economic Analysis of Land Titling in Peru, 42 Q. J. INT’L AGRIC. 79 (2003) (land title 
increases access to formal credit and is correlated to higher investment); Lee J. Alston, Gary D. 
Libecap & Robert Schneider, The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on 
the Brazilian Frontier (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5405, 1996); Frank 
Byamugisha, How Land Registration Affects Financial Development and Economic Growth in 
Thailand (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2241, 1999) 
(land titling has positive effects on financial development). 
 25. Anne-Sophie Brasselle et al., Land Tenure Security and Investment Incentives: Further 
Puzzling Evidence from Burkina Faso, 67 J. DEV. ECON. 373, 373 (2002) (results from Burkina 
Faso suggest that there may not be a systematic positive correlation between increased land 
tenure security and increased investment); Frank Place & Peter Hazell, Productivity Effects of 
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II.  PROPERTY OWNERSHIP ACHIEVED THROUGH LAND TITLING DEEPENS 
DEMOCRACY 
There have been several critiques of land titling.26  Most notably, scholars 
and policymakers alike have claimed that inter alia, land titling promotes 
further land invasions,27 rewards illegal actions,28 gives people ownership of 
worthless and/or environmentally unsound land,29 undermines or is not as 
effective as customary forms of land tenure,30 increases property values such 
that housing becomes unaffordable to the poorest sectors,31 makes land 
 
Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 10, 16–19 
(1993) (investments and productivity of land and access to credit are not significantly related to 
individualized land rights). 
 26. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (stating that the clear definition of property 
rights is not sufficient to create new markets in these rights and that lack of property rights can 
lead to a tragedy of the commons (overuse of land) while the presence of property rights can 
result in a tragedy of the anticommons (underuse of the land)); Flávio A.M. de Souza, The Future 
of Informal Settlements: Lessons in the Legalization of Disputed Urban Land in Recife, Brazil, 32 
GEOFORUM 483, 491 (2001); Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. LAW 183, 187–208 (1995) (offering six land titling myths). 
 27. See Atuahene, supra note 5, at 1130. 
 28. In Peru land invasions were not conducted by criminals with the intent of amassing 
public land.  Land invasions were executed by desperate, poor people who were fleeing from 
poverty or violence resulting from guerilla warfare in the countryside.  The government and 
private sector failed to provide affordable accommodation for the expanding urban population, so 
when people were faced with the choice of invasion or homelessness, they invaded.  As I 
mentioned supra note 6 and accompanying text, government officials often encouraged invasions, 
so the government’s complicity in the illegal act of land invasion goes beyond its failure to 
provide low-cost housing.  See Atuahene, supra note 5, at 1130. 
 29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Ellen Bassett & Harvey Jacobs, Community-based Tenure Reform in Urban Africa: 
The Community Land Trust Experiment in Voi, Kenya, 14 LAND USE POL’Y 215, 228 (1997) 
(concluding that although “people universally want and will pursue . . . individual (or family) title 
to the land . . . there are instances where individual interests are best served by community-based 
tenure”); Tor A. Benjaminsen, Formalizing Land Tenure in Rural Africa, 29 F. DEV. STUD. 362, 
364, 366 (2002) (Customary forms of tenure may be preferable due to overlapping rights and 
uses.  Formalization may ossify rights and deprive communities of adaptability and flexibility 
vital to certain communities); Katherine V. Gough & Paul W.K. Yankson, Land Markets in 
African Cities: The Case of Peri-urban Accra, Ghana, 37 URB. STUD. 2485, 2497 (2000) 
(examining both the advantages and disadvantages of customary land tenure in Accra and 
recommending specific modifications). 
 31. ALAN GILBERT, THE LATIN AMERICAN CITY 98 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that poor people’s 
self-help housing in Latin America is affordable, unlike government housing); Rod Burgess, Petty 
Commodity Housing or Dweller Control? A Critique of John Turner’s Views on Housing Policy, 
6 WORLD DEV. 1105, 1120 (1978) (“If [the Latin American state] legalizes such lands before 
possession, it will merely allow for the market valuation of these lands, which otherwise would 
have been invaded or bought illegally (at lower prices).”); Jane Larson, Informality, Illegality, 
and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137 (2002) (“Nonconformity with law is a means of 
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alienable and subject to foreclosure or legal acquisition by richer or more 
savvy populations who will push out poorer populations,32 increases conflict 
and divisions in society,33 incorrectly assumes that the poor will be able to 
leverage their newly titled homes to access capital,34 and has ephemeral 
economic benefits.35 
The most salient critique relates to the distributional implications inherent 
in de Soto’s proposal, which distributes land titles based on present occupation.  
Those who reside on the land may not be the neediest, but instead may be the 
most aggressive and cunning, characteristics society is likely to frown upon. 
 
gaining access to land not otherwise available for development, and access to housing not 
otherwise affordable to the settler population.”). 
 32. Jonathan Manders, Note, Sequencing Property Rights in the Context of Development: A 
Critique of the Writings of Hernando de Soto, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 177, 180, 186 (2004) 
(noting that the wealthy may use their economic and political leverage to acquire what has been 
made an alienable right).  Many Native American lands were converted from communal to 
individual ownership under the General Allotment Act of 1887.  Unencumbered by collective 
interests, individuals began to sell communal native lands to outsiders.  This had dire 
consequences for Native American self-determination with respect to the lands in its territory.  
Congress did stop the individualization of tribal lands via the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
(IRA), but this was only after tribes had lost over 90 million acres of their land to white settlers.  
See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 8–20 (1995).  See generally 
Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in Africa, 25 
WORLD DEV. 1317, 1320 (1997) (stating that land titling concentrates ownership in the hands of 
savvy persons including male household heads and community leaders while the less savvy are 
dispossessed of the nominal rights they once had). 
 33. Anan Ganjanapan, The Northern Thai Land Tenure System: Local Customs versus 
National Laws 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 609 (1994) (stating that a study of villages in Chiang Mai, 
Thailand, suggests that the titling program caused conflicts among villagers and encouraged 
villagers to assume unsustainable debt burdens, which increased the risk of foreclosure).  See 
generally Mario Fandino, Land Titling and Peasant Differentiation in Honduras, 20 LATIN AM. 
PERSP. 45 (1993); Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third 
World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1013–14 (2006) (“Long-term conflict 
has resulted because poor or otherwise vulnerable land occupiers have been dispossessed by 
wealthier and more powerful groups; yet the new titleholders and state enforcement mechanisms 
have been unable to prevent encroachment by the former occupiers. . . . In other cases, titling 
programs provoke long-term conflict due to the fluid nature of nonstate systems of land tenure.”). 
 34. Amin Sajeda, Ashok S. Rai & Giorgio Topa, Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and 
Vulnerable? Evidence from Northern Bangladesh, 70 J. DEV. ECON 59, 60 (2003) (although 
micro credit does reach the poor, it does not reach the vulnerable). 
 35. Fitzpatrick, supra note 33, at 1015–16. 
This is illustrated by the paradigmatic case of Kenya, where, although individualized 
titling programs initially appeared to yield productivity benefits, the titles register 
gradually lost value as an accurate record of land relations due to high formal and 
informal registration costs and inconsistency between state law and local inheritance and 
transfer practices.  As a result, it appears that any economic benefits attributable to land 
titling were not sustained over time. 
Id. 
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Despite its imperfections, I agree with the strategy of distributing land title 
based on present occupation for several reasons.  First, it circumvents the need 
to determine who is deserving and who is not.36  This divisive exercise will 
inevitably drive a wedge between neighbors who have been living together in a 
squatter settlement for years.  This endeavor is also subject to government 
failure.  That is to say, assuming that the government can devise objective 
criteria for determining who is deserving, then this creates a rent-seeking 
opportunity for bureaucrats given the task of implementing the program. 
Second, there are millions of squatters who have acquired informal 
occupancy rights through long-term possession.  Allocation of land titles based 
on present occupation acknowledges and embraces existing realities by 
formalizing existing informal arrangements.37  Third, distribution of land titles 
based on present occupation takes into account the fact that many people came 
to cities and invaded lands not because they were thieves, but in order to avoid 
starvation and/or violence in rural areas.38  It also acknowledges that they often 
engaged in invasions with the complicity of government.39 
Although I do agree with the allocation of land titles based on present 
occupation, I also acknowledge that this can lead to further land invasions.40  
However, there are simple ways to circumvent a stampede.  For instance, in 
Peru the government instituted an amnesty of sorts.  The government declared 
that for any invasion that occurred before March 22, 1996, those who presently 
occupy the land receive title.41  For any invasion that occurred after the 
appointed date, occupants would be removed from the land.  So far as the 
Peruvian government adheres to this policy and potential invaders are 
convinced that there will be no future amnesty, then this is a promising policy 
for dealing with the brooding threat of future invasions.  Another strategy is to 
have communities purchase their land titles through micro finance-type 
 
 36. There is some value in having targeted beneficiaries.  In order to achieve spatial 
integration, my concept of titling mobility requires the use of targeted beneficiaries.  I propose 
that those society deems to be among the neediest should receive free land title where they reside, 
while those who have some capacity to pay should collectively buy strategically located land 
through micro-finance schemes such as the one used in the Philippines.  This proposal avoids 
serious issues of divisiveness because it is not a matter of people getting left out (i.e., everyone 
can get title to the land on which she resides), but rather some people are given additional options 
based on their wants and financial capabilities.  See Atuahene, supra note 5. 
 37. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
 38. Center for Defense Information, supra note 7. 
 39. See generally Graham, supra note 6. 
 40. In the Huascar invasion, 35,000 people participated.  Id. at 107.  They were not allowed 
to remain on the land they had invaded, but instead the government gave them alternate lands on 
which they could reside.  Id.  This encouraged other landless families to invade and, more 
specifically lead to the invasions in Bayovar, Ariba Peru, and Villa Hermosa.  Id. 
 41. Atuahene, supra note 5, at 1131 (citing La Comisión de Formalizción de la Propriedad 
Informal (COFOPRI) (Mar. 1, 2003), http://www.cofopri.gob.pe). 
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programs like the one found in the Philippines called the Community Mortgage 
Program (CMP).42  In the CMP, the incentive to invade is mitigated somewhat 
because land invasions do not automatically lead to free land titles.43 
Despite the various critiques that I have mentioned in this section, the data 
consistently show that titling has significant economic value.44  I would like to 
expand the discussion relating to the virtues of land titling by analyzing its 
political value.45  In the following section, I will give four reasons why 
property ownership via land titling can deepen and strengthen the nascent 
democracies in which it is pursued.46 
A. Property Ownership Gives Indigent Populations a Buffer Between 
Themselves and the State, Which Allows Independent Electoral Decisions 
Vital to a Functioning Democracy 
In a liberal democracy, rights inter alia protect individuals against 
government.  However, widespread economic dependence on government 
largess can interfere with the exercise of these rights.47  New democracies are 
especially vulnerable to systematic compromise by opportunistic politicians 
who can use their unchecked power over people’s subsistence and control of 
government largess to get re-elected.  Privatizing land by giving people 
ownership in fee simple to the public land they occupy will inject a dose of 
independence into patronage-infested democracies. 
In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton correctly asserted that “[i]n the general 
course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power 
over his will.”48  In other words, if the State has amassed an inordinate amount 
 
 42. See Id. at 1130–31. 
 43. Id.; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse 
Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1152 (1984).  In the context of applying a liability rule to 
cases of adverse possession, Merrill states that “[s]quatters and thieves would know that, even if 
they could obtain title to property after the passage of the statute of limitations and the 
satisfaction of the common law’s five elements, they would have to pay for their gain.  Id.  
Consequently, the incentive to engage in coerced transfers would be reduced.” 
 44. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
 45. While many forms of property enhance democracy, land-based property has additional 
benefits.  It is more visible, tangible and hence more real to people than other property rights such 
as stocks or bonds.  It is an integral component of our everyday lives and consequently is imbued 
with more meaning. 
 46. My argument that land titling deepens democracy is predicated upon a factual 
understanding of how squatters acquire titled land.  Land titled is either government land 
bequeathed to the squatters or it is private land that squatters buy collectively (as in the Philippine 
CMP program) or that the government buys for them.  Governments are supposed to ensure that 
there is good title before the land is officially transferred to squatters. 
 47. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 760 (1964). 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001).  Hamilton argued that true independence for judges was contingent upon 
them obtaining a fixed salary for their subsistence: “[W]e can never hope to see realized in 
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of power over a person’s material well-being, then her political independence 
can be easily compromised.  The veracity of this statement has been repeatedly 
tested and proven. 
There were many instances throughout the 1960s where the political 
independence of black Americans was compromised by their economic 
dependence.  Blacks were not allowed to exercise their constitutional right to 
vote in the South long after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
1965 Voting Rights Act.  Many white, racist landowners threatened to fire or 
evict black sharecroppers who worked their land if they exercised their voting 
rights.49  Only black landowners and other economically independent families 
 
practice the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system which 
leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resource on the occasional grants of the latter.”  Id.; 
see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *171 (“The true reason of requiring any 
qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a 
situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own.”); STEVEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY 
OF PROPERTY 241–46 (1990) (a decent life requires certain minimum entitlements); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 37, 38 (1990) (“In this R/republican tradition, there is a recognition that for one truly 
to be a citizen in a democracy and to participate in the democratic process, one needs a minimum 
amount of independence.  Economic independence is necessary if the citizen is to be able to 
deliberate on the common good, the res publica, the thing public”); Frank I. Michelman, 
Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1329 
(1987). 
In the ancient and early modern republican traditions of which the founding generation 
were still in some measure partaking, an unquestionably secure base of material support 
was viewed as indispensable if one’s independence and competence as a participant in 
public affairs was to be guaranteed.  Material security was thought necessary to ensure the 
authenticity and reliability of one’s politically expressed judgment regarding what  course 
of policy would best conduce to the rights and other interests of the governed.  The person 
whose material security became a matter of doubt or contingency—either because the 
person had no property and thus depended for livelihood on the grace of others or because 
the person relied on a form of property such as public office, pension, or public debt, that 
was constantly up for grabs in the conduct of government itself—would too likely act in 
public councils either as the tool of his patron or as the tool of his own particular, 
immediate, and possibly delusive material interest. 
Id.  Carol Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 345 (1996) 
(“Property is the keystone right because property makes individuals independent and thus capable 
of self-government. . . . [P]roperty removes people’s dependence on others, and fundamental 
autonomy makes them capable of exercising unencumbered judgment in the political forum.”); 
Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
335, 351–52 (1989).  See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American 
Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1991). 
 49. The reprisals were especially effective when blacks were dependent on the state’s largess 
or plantation owners.  The famous and intrepid voting rights activist, Fannie Lou Hamer, attested 
to the breadth of such reprisals: 
On just one day—September 3, 1962—these incidents occurred, all connected to the vote 
drive: a black city worker in Ruleville was fired, two black dry cleaning establishments 
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and individuals were somewhat shielded from these abuses of power.50  There 
is also a patron-client literature that documents how rural elites in the 
developing world systematically leverage their ownership of land and their 
concomitant access to resources to illicitly gain political control using methods 
similar to those employed in the rural South during the Civil Rights 
Movement.51  These examples show that throughout the world, economic 
independence is a predicate to meaningful political rights. 
As Charles Reich aptly pointed out years ago, economic dependence 
comes in several forms.52  We should not only focus upon the dependence of 
the landless on a landowner for their basic needs, but also on the dependence 
of citizens on the growing largess of the state for their subsistence.53  Reich 
notes that without regard for an individual’s basic right to be free from the 
state’s undue interference in one’s private affairs, in 1941, a New York 
appellate court decided to uphold an administrative decision to withhold a 
man’s public assistance because he literally lived in what was tantamount to a 
pig sty.54  The court reasoned that “[o]ne would admire his independence if he 
were not so dependent, but he has no right to defy the standards and 
conventions of civilized society while being supported at public expense.”55  
This indigent man’s independence was abridged by his economic dependence 
on the state. 
Despite its putative status as the international icon of democracy, it is not 
necessary to search America’s past to locate instances in which independence 
is compromised by economic dependence.  As recently as 1990, the cultural 
and political independence of Native American tribes was undermined by their 
economic dependence on the state’s largess.  In Employment Division, 
 
were shut down, Williams Chapel Baptist Church was told it was losing its tax exemption 
and free water, and a plantation bus driver was told that henceforth he would need a hard-
to-obtain commercial license to ferry workers to the field.  The fired city worker’s wife 
had been going to the voter registration classes.  The dry cleaners were owned by blacks.  
The suddenly uninsured church was a meeting place for voter registration workers.  And 
the mother of the harassed bus driver had registered to vote. 
KAY MILLS, THIS LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER 40 (1993). 
 50. Consequently, these people were more often able to exercise their political independence 
by taking leadership roles in grassroots organizations committed to civil rights for blacks.  Id. 
 51. JOHN P. ENTELLIS, CULTURE AND COUNTERCULTURE IN MOROCCAN POLITICS 48 
(1989); GARY W. WYNIA, THE POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 48 (2d ed. 1984); 
James C. Scott, Patron–Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia, 66 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 91 (1972). 
 52. Reich, supra note 47, at 756–58. 
 53. Id. at 758. 
 54. Id. (citing Wilkie v. O’Connor, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (1941)). 
 55. Wilkie, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 619.  This statement succinctly validates Hamilton’s intuitions 
about political independence. 
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Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,56 the court upheld a 
lower court decision to withhold unemployment benefits from two Native 
Americans because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug that has been 
used for centuries by certain tribes in various cultural ceremonies.57  Oregon’s 
state law does not allow employees discharged for work-related misconduct 
and drug use to receive unemployment benefits.58  The ceremonial use of 
peyote is illegal in Oregon, thus when Smith and Black were fired from their 
jobs, they were unable to collect unemployment benefits.59  In a blow to the 
cultural and political independence of many Native Americans, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was not 
violated by the state’s prohibition of the sacramental use of peyote and the 
subsequent denial of benefits.60  For those native Americans who are 
dependent on unemployment benefits, the consequences of exercising their 
cultural and political independence can be crippling. 
The politics surrounding informal settlements are no exception to the 
maxim that economic dependence compromises an individual’s independence.  
Informal settlements are a form of government largess, which poor people 
depend upon for basic sustenance.  As I outlined earlier in this Article, many 
informal settlements are initiated through extralegal land invasions.61  As long 
as the state agrees not to evict the squatters, then the state is in effect issuing a 
tacit license to reside on its lands, which is revocable at will. 
As “Operation Drive-Out Trash” in Zimbabwe demonstrates, this license 
can be revoked when squatters become politically dispensable.62  On May 19, 
2005, the ruling party in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), began the process of evicting individuals and 
families from Harare’s urban squatter settlements forty-eight days after the 
general election.63  The U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in 
Zimbabwe conducted a fact-finding mission which discovered that about 
700,000 people lost their home, business, or both due to this ill-planned mass 
 
 56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 874–75. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Smith, 494 U.S at 874–75. 
 60. Id. at 890. 
 61. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 62. The actual name is “Operation Murambatsvina,” which is the Shona translation of 
“Drive Out Trash.”  Sydneysider.com, Operation Murambatsvina: Drive Out Trash, 
http://sydneysider.com.au/news/42/operationmurambatsvinadriveouttrash (last visited Mar. 28, 
2006). 
 63. ANNA KAJUMULO TIBAIJUKA, REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO ZIMBABWE 
TO ASSESS THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA BY THE U.N. SPECIAL 
ENVOY ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS ISSUES IN ZIMBABWE 7, 15, 20 (2005), 
http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf. 
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eviction.64  The government had its purported reasons for initiating the mass 
evictions,65 but it is widely believed that the evictions were a reprisal against 
areas that have repeatedly voted against the ZANU-PF in presidential and 
parliamentary elections.66  If this is in fact true, then this is an acutely clear 
instance where people’s political independence was jeopardized by their 
dependence on the state’s largess. 
Charles Reich stresses the importance of creating property interests in 
government largess so that people have the means to act independently and are 
not in a constant state of political vulnerability.67  Land titling does just this.  It 
transforms a person’s tacit license to reside on government lands into a 
property interest in fee simple.68  Property rights attained through land titling 
provide a measure of economic independence so individuals are less 
vulnerable to political reprisals like the one orchestrated by the ZANU-PF in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. The government of Zimbabwe offered the following rationales for the mass eviction: 
“arresting disorderly or chaotic urbanization, including its health consequences; stopping illegal, 
parallel market transactions, especially foreign currency dealing and hoarding of consumer 
commodities in short supply; and reversing environmental damage caused by inappropriate urban 
agricultural practices.”  Id. at 20. 
 66. Id.; see also Zimbabwe Slum Clearance May Worsen AIDS Epidemic, Doctors Say, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, July 6, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer= 
Europe&sid=afKbKiEzF_kM; UN Condemns Zimbabwe Slum Blitz, BBCNEWS.CO.UK, July 22, 
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4706115.stm. 
 67. Reich, supra note 47, at 771, 786. 
Political rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the will and the means 
to act independently. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Only by making such benefits into rights can the welfare state achieve its goal of 
providing a secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society 
where each man cannot be wholly the master of his own destiny. 
Id. 
 68. Most land titling programs result in individuals receiving title in fee simple.  Collectively 
titled land, however, is also a possibility.  For example, in the Philippine Community Mortgage 
Program (CMP), the government buys land from private owners.  See Atuahene, supra note 5, at 
1131.  Then a community of squatters gets a mortgage in exchange for collective title to the land.  
Id.  After the mortgage has been amortized significantly through collective payments, then title 
can be individualized.  Id. at 1146–47.  The downside of collectively titled land is that is it is 
difficult to use collective title as collateral to obtain a loan for productive purposes.  While it is 
possible in New York cooperative apartments to draw a loan against a collective title, loans to 
squatters are too small to make this complicated financial transaction profitable for banks in the 
case of developing nations. 
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While there is not a fixed or predetermined amount of property that 
ensures political independence,69 it is important to note that the democracy-
enhancing effects of property ownership are more pronounced when it is 
distributed to poor people, and less pronounced for someone who owns a 
significant amount of property.  For instance, the democracy-enhancing effects 
of ownership are more profound for someone who lives in poverty and 
receives title to land on which she resides, as opposed to someone who 
acquires her third home.  In the former, property ownership is establishing the 
buffer, while in the latter, it is fortifying it.70 
B. Property Ownership Makes Poor People Stakeholders in Democratic 
Institutions 
Stakeholders are people who own, or are somehow invested in, one piece 
of a larger enterprise.  A stakeholder in the enterprise of democracy is a person 
who has a self interest in its perpetuation and proper functioning.  For several 
reasons property ownership can transform a marginalized individual into a 
stakeholder.71 
First, property ownership gives one an incentive to play the game (i.e., 
participate in the democratic enterprise).  Property is a legal fiction that 
protects certain interests at the expense of others, 72 and this fiction is made 
real through the creation and enforcement of laws.73  Democratic institutions 
afford property owners the opportunity to influence these laws.  Consequently, 
 
 69. In the context of squatter communities, ensuring political independence can result from 
something as inexpensive as land title, but in the context of elections it could cost millions of 
dollars to ensure candidates are politically independent and not beholden to corporate interests. 
 70. I acknowledge that the inverse can also be true.  The more land a person has, the more 
power a state can have over her.  However, the state’s power has different effects.  For those with 
fewer resources it is likely to affect their ability to subsist.  In contrast, for those with more 
resources, their ability to live well is affected. 
 71. See generally David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New 
Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 461 
(1982–1983).  It is conceptually helpful to liken an individual’s relationship to a democratic 
society to the metaphor of a game.  The game is the democratic enterprise.  Stakeholders are the 
players.  The rules are societal laws created through various democratic institutions.  The playing 
field is the background against which the game is played. 
 72. I acknowledge that in the Lockean configuration, there are some forms of property that 
are pre-political and thus not a political fiction.  See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1698). 
 73. For example, a property rule that allows an individual to secure a patent for cultural 
knowledge privileges this individual at the expense of the community that has been using the 
information without restriction for centuries; or a rule that formalizes the principle of “finder’s 
keepers” privileges people who happen upon lost property over true owners.  These are all 
political choices that a society makes. 
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property owners have a compelling incentive to participate in the lawmaking 
process in order to protect their interests.74 
Second, property ownership brings more players into the game.  In Peru, 
with the stroke of a pen, thousands of poor people were transformed into 
stakeholders.75  For several years, even decades, impoverished populations 
lived precariously on government land, with nominal tenure security, each day 
in jeopardy of dispossession.  With the advent of land titling, the same people 
now own the plot of land on which they have been residing for years and enjoy 
the residual benefits of property ownership.76  Unlike other forms of 
privatization, where resources are transferred to local elite or multinationals, 
land titling transfers resources to the poor masses and thereby gives them a 
stakeholding. 
Third, property ownership consolidates the rules of the game.  After the 
land titling process is complete, formally marginalized people own property 
recognized and protected by the state; this gives them an opportunity to play, 
abide by, or change the rules established by the state instead of those enforced 
by local power brokers.77  In informal communities, local bosses and loan 
sharks often fill the vacuum left by the state’s absence. 78  For instance, a 
 
 74. Those dependent on government largess, in theory, also have a strong incentive to 
participate in the lawmaking process.  In reality, those dependent on government largess are 
among society’s poor.  For many reasons, poor people are less likely to vote.  See DAY & 
HOLDER, supra note 3, at 8; JAMIESON, SHIN & DAY, supra note 3, at 5–8; DAY & GAITHER, 
supra note 3, at 7. 
 75. Between 1991 and 1995 alone about 300,000 titles were registered in urban Lima.  
PERU-URBAN PROPERTY RIGHTS PROJECT REPORT NO. PID6523 2, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/05/18/000009265_39809291017
51/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
 76. See Atuahene, supra note 5, at 1138–42 (describing Peru’s land titling process). 
 77. It is more efficient for everyone to play by the same rules.  The dominance of local 
bosses may not present Herculean problems if each community were content trading within itself.  
However, trade would be severely hindered if each time an outsider wanted to occupy a property, 
she had to learn a new set of unpublished rules.  See Ngugi, supra note 1, at 476. 
 78. Depending on the particular situation, the local boss can be a legitimate community 
association or an organized crime-like unit.  Carol Rose states, “[P]roperty protected by formal 
title tends to erode the kinds of ‘natural,’ community-based property rights that can predate 
government.”  Carol M. Rose, Privatization–The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 
704 (2006).  This statement under-emphasizes the presence of mafia-like organizations in 
informal settlements that often fill the void left by the state’s absence.  See JAMES L. GARRETT, 
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, COMEDORES POPULARES: LESSONS FOR 
URBAN PROGRAMMING FROM PERUVIAN COMMUNITY KITCHENS 13 (2001), 
http://www.ifpri.org/themes/mp14/unpublished/m14careperu.pdf (“Multiple levels of authority, 
official and unofficial, operate across multiple spheres of action.  Neighborhoods face potential 
intervention not only from national and municipal authorities but also from local actors, including 
local elected officials, party leaders, and even criminal ‘bosses’ or gangs.”); see also Erica Field, 
Property Rights, Community Public Goods and Household Time Allocation in Urban Squatter 
Communities: Evidence From Peru, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 837, 865 (2004) (land titling shifts 
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dispute as to who can occupy a particular plot of land cannot be adjudicated in 
local courts because informal communities are not formally recognized by the 
state.  Instead, local bosses act as arbitrators, and the involved parties are 
denied all procedural and substantive protections of the state.79  If someone 
requires a loan, she cannot go to the state lending institution or a private bank 
and use her home as collateral to secure a loan.  Instead, that person’s only 
recourse is to go to loan sharks who exact exorbitant interest rates and at times 
levy lethal fines for failure to repay. 
Fourth, property brings more people into the game with an incentive to 
play harmoniously.  Political instability can undermine a democracy.  It results 
when people’s interests are drastically divergent and there is no accepted 
process that can effectively reconcile those interests.80  Property is one area 
that often leads to inflammatory divisions in society.81  Through land titling, 
the landless are given the opportunity to become property owners, thereby to 
some degree reconciling formerly incongruent interests and promoting peace 
and stability.  More importantly, property owners should be invested in 
ensuring that their society’s dispute reconciliation mechanisms function 
because their property rights become unstable when societal disputes spiral out 
of control and chaos prevails. 
 
the burden of property protection to the state rather than individuals and/or communities); Curtis 
J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical 
Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 92 (2000) (“[P]rivate ordering by organized 
criminal firms is a substitute for state-provided and state-sanctioned enforcement mechanisms.”).  
Also, a functioning democracy is a prerequisite for an individual to play and abide by the rules of 
the game established by the state.  If an aura of corruption envelopes the courts or if the state’s 
enforcement powers are ineffective, then local power brokers will fill the lacuna. 
 79. This can be a problem even if a community is lucky enough to have a community 
organization in control and not a mafia-like organization, because although sometimes 
community organizations function more efficiently than the state in addressing disputes, other 
times they do not.  The travesty is that the justice system is not centralized and consistent, which 
means similarly situated parties can receive drastically different results.  See generally Rose, 
supra note 78. 
 80. I am not convinced by the distraction argument, which claims that property security 
promotes commerce and commerce deflects attention away from politics, thus making politics 
less volatile.  See Rose, supra note 78, at 710–14.  I believe the correct lens for analyzing political 
instability is one that focuses on divergence of interests and the efficiency of the established 
process for reconciling these discordant interests. 
 81. Amy Chua has documented how political instability is fostered when property-rich 
ethnic minorities are faced with the native propertyless masses who have acquired political power 
as part of the global move towards democratization.  AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW 
EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 
127–31 (2003). 
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C. Property Ownership Gives People an Incentive to Secure Greater 
Liberties 
There is a strong connection between the free flow of information 
guaranteed by the right to free speech and free press and property ownership.  
Property ownership concentrates information in the hands of the owner.82  This 
is why owners need a free flow of information to maximize their assets.  
Consequently, property ownership should increase the demand for liberties that 
ensure free flow of information. 
Also, in Buckley v. Valeo,83 the U.S. Supreme Court insisted that freedom 
of speech is connected to property when it ruled that certain campaign finance 
restrictions unduly limit an individual’s right to free speech.84  Under Buckley, 
the right to free speech results in more freedom to dispose of one’s property as 
one sees fit.85  This should give property owners an incentive to advocate for 
increased liberties and hence help democracy to thrive.86 
D. Property Ownership Provides a Space Where Individual Autonomy Is 
Respected and Minority Viewpoints, Critical to a Healthy Democracy, 
Can Thrive 
Individual autonomy is one of the core elements of democracy.87  A 
society must create spaces where its denizens can develop their sense of 
autonomy and individuality because this is the clay from which diverse 
viewpoints, so critical to a robust democracy, are formed.  Individual 
autonomy, however, is often at odds with another defining element of 
democracy—majority rule.  Property ownership resolves this tension by 
providing a space of autonomy where an individual can exercise her will even 
 
 82. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2004).  
Smith argues that 
property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses together and delegating to the 
owner the choice of how to use the asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any 
stage . . . property rules have advantages that stem from this delegation to the owner of the 
tasks of gathering and acting on information about assets. 
Id. 
 83. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 84. Id. at 44; see Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of 
Property, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1553, 1563–68 (2002) (noting the racially discriminatory results of 
connecting property to freedom of speech). 
 85. Overton, supra note 84, at 1564. 
 86. Many commentators have claimed that property is the keystone right.  See JAMES W. 
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 26 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting Arthur Lee as saying: “The right of property is the guardian of 
every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.”). 
 87. Voting is one of the most important acts in a democracy and, more importantly, is an 
exercise of individual autonomy.  See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights 
of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 182 (2003). 
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when it does not coincide with the will of the majority.  In this space, to a large 
extent the powerful state is kept in abeyance so that people can make 
independent choices that may go against the interests of the majority. 
[P]roperty performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and 
pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to 
the owner. . . . The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while the Bill of 
Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis, 
property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life.88 
By providing a space of autonomy where minority viewpoints can flourish, 
property ownership can enhance the democratic trajectory of countries. 
E. If the Process Undertaken to Distribute Land Titles is Corrupt This May 
Initially Undermine Democracy; However If Distributed to the Needy, 
Then the Property Allocated Can Buttress Democracy in the Four Ways 
Described Above 
In several countries, the granting of land titles is a highly politicized 
process.  It is not uncommon for politicians to distribute title to land just before 
an election, effectively holding the provision of stable shelter out like a carrot 
before a starved electorate.  For instance, “[t]wo weeks before the midterm 
elections of August 1991, Salinas [the incumbent President] toured Mexico and 
personally handed out in less than ten days as many land titles as distributed by 
the Mexican government over the past fourteen years.”89  This was widely, and 
rightfully, viewed as an unabashed attempt by the Partido Revolucionario 
Institutional (PRI) to distribute government largess in the form of land titles in 
exchange for votes.90  However, if the distribution of land titles was one of the 
most pressing needs of the people, then is it accurate to claim that this 
expenditure of resources was nothing more than a thinly veiled vote-buying 
scheme? 
In representative democracies, one of a politician’s many duties is to 
contribute to the process of addressing the needs of her constituency.  If the 
majority of the electorate does not approve of her choices, then, in a 
functioning democracy, the politician can be voted out at the end of her term.  
 
 88. Reich, supra note 47, at 771. 
 89. Cynthia Anderson-Barker, A Case Study of Elections in the State of Michoacan on July 
12, 1992, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 307, 320–21 (1994) (quoting DENISE DRESSER, 
NEOPOPULIST SOLUTIONS TO NEOLIBERAL PROBLEMS: MEXICO’S NATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
PROGRAM 24 (1991)).  This phenomenon is not limited to Mexico.  See, e.g., Mark Fineman, 
Aquino, Rebels on Propaganda Campaign Trail, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1986, at 10 (reporting that 
Philippino President Aquino blamed the squatter problem on exiled President Marcos, who she 
claims promised squatters legal title to land without a legal mandate.  Aquino claimed that the 
squatters’ present problem was a result of “the promise of a desperate politician who wanted to 
buy the votes of the poor”). 
 90. See Anderson-Barker, supra note 89, at 307, 320–22. 
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The line between the illicit act of vote-buying and a legitimate effort to satiate 
the electorate’s needs is determined by the process undertaken.  A decision to 
allocate land titles will have more legitimacy if it has traversed the established 
and legitimate processes of democratic deliberation.  For instance, a decision 
that was vetted through the legislature, allowed space for various parties to 
shape the policy, and involved some form of popular engagement and debate 
would be on the democratic end of the spectrum.  In contrast, a decision that 
bypassed the system of democratic checks and balances and was forced 
through near election time by an executive using her bully pulpit would be on 
the opposite end. 
In the example above, at the time Salinas distributed the land titles, Mexico 
was a democracy in name only.  In reality, it was a one-party government 
dominated by the PRI and bereft of the traditional checks and balances vital to 
a properly functioning democracy.91  When Salinas handed out hundreds of 
land titles to impoverished slum dwellers two weeks before the election, this 
was a clear instance of vote buying because he bypassed the democratic 
decision-making process.92 
A true democracy entails rule by the people where each individual is 
expected to vote his or her conscience.  In a democracy where votes can be 
bought, however, those with the most resources rule.  The Mexican example 
demonstrates how the privatization of public land through land titling done in 
an undemocratic environment can lead to vote buying and hence initially 
undermine rather than strengthen democracy.93  Once the land has been 
privatized, however, then democracy will be edified along the lines of the four 
arguments given above if the land was distributed to poor populations and not 
the financially privileged.94 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I have argued that land titling is a form of privatization with the potential 
to deepen democracy.  Land titling enhances democracy by creating a 
 
 91. Id. at 307. 
 92. Id. at 319, 320–22.  While a legitimate process may not guarantee a fair result, it greatly 
improves the likelihood that the outcome will be fair. 
 93. This is consistent with Carol Rose’s claim that “privatization and democratization are 
siblings, co-existing in a mixed environment of mutual support [and] dependence . . . .”  See 
Rose, supra note 78, at 694. 
 94. If land titles are not distributed within the context of a functioning and transparent 
democracy, then it is more likely that political cronies will receive title rather than the neediest.  
See Timothy Lindsey, Square Pegs & Round Holes: Fitting Modern Title into Traditional 
Societies in Indonesia, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 699, 700 (describing Indonesia’s experience 
with land titling under its Basic Agrarian Law (BAL): “[T]he  BAL’s land reforms have largely 
failed, mainly due to labyrinthine and corrupt modes of implementation that have turned land 
administration into a bureaucratic rentier activity.”). 
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property-owning society.  Property ownership allows previously vulnerable 
populations to make independent electoral decisions, increases the number of 
stakeholders in society gives people an incentive to secure greater liberties, and 
provides a space where autonomy is respected and minority viewpoints can 
thrive.  If corruption is rampant then the process undertaken to distribute land 
titles may initially undermine democracy, but if distributed to poor people, the 
property allocated can deepen democracy. 
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